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ABSTRACT 
Capability approach pioneers Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum both recognize empowerment as an 
important aspect of human development. They seem to disagree, however, about how empowerment 
should be represented within the capability approach (CA). This essay is concerned with the analysis 
of the foundational concepts at work within Sen and Nussbaum’s CAs. Part One concerns the key 
concepts of empowerment at work in Sen’s CA and has three goals. 1) Clarify Sen’s various 
empowerment concepts. 2) Argue that Sen’s concept of Realize Agency Success is flawed. 3) Make 
clear that empowerment in Sen’s approach can be helpfully understood in terms of agency and 
capability set expansion. Part Two considers Nussbaum’s CA and the debate over whether it can 
account for empowerment. I conclude that not only can Nussbaum’s CA account for empowerment, 
but that the role of empowerment in both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s CAs can be understood in terms of 
agency and capability set expansion. In other words, Sen and Nussbaum actually agree about 
empowerment at the foundational level.  
Keywords: Capability Approach; Empowerment; Amartya Sen; Martha Nussbaum; Foundational 
issues 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les pionniers de l’approche par les capabilités, Amartya Sen et Martha Nussbaum, reconnaissent tous 
deux l'empowerment comme un aspect important du développement humain. Ils semblent être en 
désaccord, cependant, sur la façon dont l'empowerment devrait être représenté au sein de l'approche 
par les capabilités (CA). Cet essai concerne l'analyse des concepts fondamentaux mis en œuvre au 
sein de l’approche des capabilités chez Sen et Nussbaum. La première partie porte sur les concepts 
clés de l'empowerment dans l’approche des capabilités de Sen et a trois objectifs. 1) Clarifier les 
différents concepts d'empowerment chez Sen. 2) Montrer que le concept chez Sen de Realize Agency 
Success est vicié. 3) Mettre en évidence que l'empowerment dans l'approche de Sen peut être 
utilement compris en termes d’agence et d'expansion de l’ensemble  des capabilités. La deuxième 
partie porte sur l’approche des capabilités chez Nussbaum et le débat quant à savoir si elle peut tenir 
compte de l'empowerment. Je conclus que non seulement l’approche de Nussbaum peut tenir compte 
de l'empowerment, mais que le rôle de l'empowerment dans les approches de Sen et Nussbaum peut 
être compris en termes d'agence et d’expansion de l’ensemble de capabilités. En d'autres termes, Sen 
et Nussbaum sont d'accord sur l'empowerment au niveau fondamental. 
Mots-clés: Approche des capabilités, empowerment, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, questions 
fondamentales 
JEL: O10 
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INTRODUCTION 
Capability approach pioneers Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum both recognize 
empowerment as an important aspect of human development in a number of ways. They 
seem to disagree, however, about how empowerment should be represented within the 
capability approach (CA). Two concepts that connote empowerment, “agency” and 
“freedom,” play prominent roles in much of Sen’s work on the CA (Sen 1992; 1999; 2009). 
These concepts are shaped by two cross-cutting distinctions central to his approach: (1) the 
distinction between agency and well-being, and (2) the distinction between freedom and 
achievement. Nussbaum recognizes the importance of the concepts introduced by these 
distinctions, but she argues against using the distinctions (Nussbaum 2000). This rejection 
has led some to question whether or not Nussbaum’s version of the CA can properly account 
for empowerment, and in some cases to conclude that her CA is flawed by comparison to 
Sen’s account (Crocker 2008; Crocker and Robeyns 2010; Robeyns 2005). 
This essay is concerned with the analysis of the foundational concepts at work within Sen 
and Nussbaum’s CAs. Part One systematically presents and rationally scrutinizes the key 
concepts of empowerment at work in Sen’s version of the CA. This part of the paper has 
three goals: 1) to clarify to Sen’s various empowerment concepts, which are a source of 
confusion and debate among scholars; (Crocker 1992; 1995; 2008; Iversen 2003; Keleher 
2007) 2) to argue that Sen’s concept of Realize Agency Success (RAS) is flawed; and 3) to 
make clear that the role of empowerment in Sen’s approach can be helpfully understood in 
terms of 1) agency and 2) capability set expansion. Part Two considers Nussbaum’s rejection 
of Sen’s distinctions and briefly engages the debate over whether her CA can properly 
account for empowerment. The essay concludes that not only can Nussbaum’s version of the 
CA properly account for empowerment, the role of empowerment in both Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s versions of the CA can be understood in terms of agency and capability set 
expansion. Thus, although Sen and Nussbaum seem to disagree about how empowerment 
should be represented within the capability approach, there is actually agreement at the 
foundational level.  
This work is both philosophically and practically significant.  It is philosophically significant 
because it allows a sharper and deeper understanding of the conceptual foundations of the 
CA, which are often criticized for being unclear. It is practically significant because it allows 
us to draw confidently on both versions of the approach as we develop policy proposals 
without concerns about the theoretical integrity of our proposals. 
1. PART ONE: SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH 
1.1. Sen’s Basic Distinctions and Concepts 
“Agency” and “freedom” play prominent roles in much of Sen’s work on the CA (Sen 1992; 
1999; 2009). These concepts are shaped by a set of cross-cutting distinctions central to his 
approach.  The first distinction is between two related but irreducible dimensions of each 
person: agency and well-being. Each dimension calls for respect (often in the form of aid or 
protection) from institutions and individuals. The second distinction is between the 
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achievement and the freedom dimensions of both agency and well-being. Thus, the two 
cross-cutting distinctions of agency and well-being, and achievement and freedom, provide 
four important concepts: (1) agency achievement, (2) well-being achievement, (3) agency 
freedom, and (4) well-being freedom. Table One illustrates the basic relationship between 
these distinctions and concepts.  
 
Table One: Sen’s Distinctions: Agency and Well-Being and Freedom and Achievement2 
 Agency Well-Being 
Achievement Agency Achievement – the 
realization of goals and values a 
person chooses and has reason 
to pursue. 
Well-Being Achievement (Functionings) - 
the quality of the life an individual is 
living based on the interrelated beings 
and doings she realizes. 
Freedom Agency Freedom – the freedom 
to choose and bring about the 
achievements one has reason to 
value. 
Well-Being Freedom (Capabilities) - the 
freedom to achieve the beings and doings 
that are constitutive of one’s well-being. 
 
The following two sections (1.2 and 1.3) of the part of the paper offer a conceptual analysis 
of the four concepts represented on the table. Readers who are not interested in such detailed 
analysis may want to skip to section 1.4 in which I summarize the results of this analysis.3    
1.2. Agency Freedom and Agency Achievements  
A person’s agency achievement is her “success in the pursuit of the totality of her considered 
goals and objectives” (Sen 1992 p. 56) whatever they may be: including being well-
nourished, owning a sports car, having her children’s lives go well, protecting the 
environment, or the demise of her enemies. The achievement of these goals may enhance or 
diminish one’s own well-being. However, the goals must be ones that she autonomously 
chooses to pursue, and not simply the goals of others – even if others happen to share the 
goal. The CA is concerned with an individual’s agency in all spheres of life (political, social, 
etc.), not simply the economic sphere. 
On Sen’s account “agency success” occurs when agency objectives are achieved. Sen 
distinguishes between (1) Realized Agency Success (RAS) and (2) Instrumental Agency 
Success (IAS). RAS occurs whenever a person’s objectives are realized whether or not she 
plays any role in their achievement. IAS, by contrast, is obtained only when an individual 
plays some role in the realization of her objectives. Suppose, for example, that my agency 
objectives include both 1) an end to violence in country A, and 2) an end to the unrelated 
violence in country B, and that I am involved in the peace process for country A, but not for 
country B. Suppose further, that violence in both country A and in country B does end. On 
Sen’s account, RAS has occurred with regard to my agency objectives for both A and B.  
IAS, on the other hand, has occurred only with regard to Country A, where I was involved in 
ending the violence. IAS is a subset of RAS. This distinction allows Sen to recognize 
                                                 
2
 See Crocker 2008 p. 151. 
3
 Readers interested in an even more detailed analysis should see: Keleher 2007, Ch. 4. 
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formally the important difference between having one’s objectives realized and participating 
in the realization of one’s objectives (Sen 1992 p. 56 - 58). 
IAS is clearly a measure of one’s success as an agent. Sen is right to recognize this concept 
as a form of agency achievement. However, Sen also seems to recognize all instances of 
RAS as agency achievement. This is a mistake. Outcomes of processes in which an 
individual is not a purposive factor in any way are not measures of her success as an agent, 
and should not be considered agency achievements or instances of RAS.   
Yet, Sen’s account suggests that if Alex’s (A’s) agency objectives include having chocolate 
cake and Bailey (B) bakes a chocolate cake for A for any reason, then the conditions for 
RAS are met. On this account, the conditions for A’s RAS are met even if A is not in any 
way involved with the achievement. For example, if B baked the cake by coincidence, or to 
please someone else, or by mistake (e.g., B used the wrong cake mix). Even in the case in 
which B makes the cake with the explicit intention of frustrating A’s agency objectives: for 
example, in a case in which B believes A is dieting (to achieve the agency objective of better 
health) but that A would forsake her diet to eat chocolate cake. Sen would consider each of 
the above instance of A’s RAS. It is difficult to understand why Sen suggests that this event 
should be a measure of agency and not simply well-being or some other sort of achievement. 
After all, it is the achievement of A’s goal, but by B’s agency. The event does not reflect any 
power A has. Nevertheless, the above cake situations meet Sen’s standard for RAS: A’s 
agency objective was achieved irrespective of the part [A] manages to personally play in 
bringing about the achievement (Ibid. p. 158). 
Agency freedom is “one’s freedom to bring about the achievements one values and which 
one attempts to produce” (Ibid. p. 158). Although agency freedom is concerned with the 
freedom of the individual, it is also “inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, 
political, and economic opportunities that are available to us” (Sen 1999 pp. xi – xii.) To 
have more agency freedom is to have “more opportunity to achieve those things that we 
value, and have reason to value” (Sen 2002 p. 585).  Sen distinguishes between this 
opportunity aspect of freedom, which is “concerned primarily with our ability to achieve” 
and the process aspect of freedom, which is concerned primarily with “the processes through 
which that achievement comes about” (Ibid.). 
Control freedom, the ability to achieve objectives by making influential decisions and 
directly controlling the levers of change, is the most robust form of opportunity freedom. 
Control over resources is significantly different from access to resources. A woman who 
lives in a nice house with plenty to eat and nice clothes to wear may not be free to choose 
how to dress, or to invite others to her home for a meal. She may even be denied access to 
these resources upon the death of her husband. Such a woman has (some) access to 
resources, but not control over them.4 
Of course, direct control over the objects and events is not always better. For example, I am 
free to access the postal system to send letters great distances. However, I neither have - nor 
want - direct control over the system. My life would not be better if I had countless decisions 
to make about how each of my letters are collected (by truck or by van, at noon or at 10:00 
                                                 
4
 For more on the distinction between access and control see: March, Candida, Ines Smyth, and 
Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay. A Guide to Gender Analysis Frameworks. Oxfam GB.  
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am, etc.), routed (which airports should be used, which roads, etc.) and delivered (what 
vehicle, what time of day, etc.). Sen rightly recognizes that such an increase in my options 
would not enhance my agency.  Expanding my trivial options (e.g., routing my letters), as 
opposed to opportunities that we have reason to value “may be the result of misspecifying 
freedom by overlooking the loss of [the] option of leading a peaceful and unbothered life” 
(Sen, 1992 p. 63). I meet more of my agency objectives (including enhancing my well-being) 
because the postal service coordinates the details involved in transporting my letters.  Thus, 
while control freedom is a valuable empowerment concept used to identify and discuss a 
robust level of participation, more control, especially over trivial matters, is not necessarily 
empowering, but can diminish both agency freedom and well-being. 
Not only would it be a mistake to think that expanding the scope of our direct control always 
expands the set of freedoms we value, it would also be a mistake to think that our freedom to 
achieve our agency objectives is limited to what we can control directly. Sen uses the 
concept of “effective freedom” to explain how opportunity freedom extends beyond what we 
ourselves control directly: 
Many freedoms take the form of our ability to get what we value and want, 
without the levers of control being directly operated by us. The controls are 
exercised in line with what we value and want (i.e., in line with our ‘counterfactual 
decisions’—what we would choose), and in this sense gives us more power and 
more freedom to lead the lives that we would choose to lead (Sen 1992, p. 64) 
 
Sen claims that effective freedom is closely related to his concept of RAS. I argue that the 
concepts are significantly different. Like Sen’s RAS, effective freedom extends beyond the 
limits of our direct participation, and is enhanced whether or not we play a role in realizing 
our outcomes. My effective freedom does not depend on any action from me beyond my 
having, and in some cases expressing, the goal. However, unlike RAS, effective agency 
achievements cannot be pure coincidence or error; some elements of process are also 
important. Effective freedom requires not only that (1) our objectives are achieved, but also 
that those who operate the levels of control do so (2) in line with what we would have 
chosen, and (3) because it is what we would have chosen. Honoring the wishes of a person 
expressed in his will after his death captures the spirit of Sen’s effective freedom. When we 
honor someone’s will, we take actions (bury him in the family plot, provide for cousin 
John’s education, etc.), precisely because the actions reflect the intentions of the deceased. 
Consider the cake example: A’s effective freedom is enhanced if and only if B made 
chocolate cake because B knew it is what A would have chosen if the choice were A’s to 
make and A’s intention is a reason for B’s action. As Sen puts it: “As long as the levers of 
control are systematically exercised in line with what I would choose and for that exact 
reason, my ‘effective freedom’ is uncompromised, though my ‘freedom of control’ may be 
limited or absent” (Sen, 1992. p. 64 - 65). If B gives A chocolate cake by chance or mistake, 
and not because A would have chosen it, A’s effective freedom is not enhanced despite the 
achievement of A’s objective. Cases of coincidence or mistake are cases of RAS, but not 
effective freedom enhancement. In such cases, A’s well-being might be enhanced by eating 
the cake, but that is a separate issue. 
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If B believes that A would choose tiramisu over chocolate cake (when A would have chosen 
cake), and for this reason B prepares tiramisu, then A’s agency objective or intention is not 
realized (no RAS) and A’s agency is not enhanced (no effective freedom).5 This is true even 
if A enjoys the tiramisu as much, or more than, A would have enjoyed the cake. In a case 
where A wanted cake, but enjoyed the tiramisu, A’s well-being is enhanced, but not A’s 
agency. If B attempts to make chocolate cake because B knows A would choose it, but fails 
(the cake burns), then A’s agency objective is not achieved. Yet, I submit that A’s agency 
seems to be enhanced by B’s attempt to bring about A’s actual (not hypothetical) intention 
on A’s behalf, if my intention is a reason for B’s action. It is not clear what Sen would say 
about this. Perhaps he would say that A’s goal of B’s working on B’s behalf is achieved, but 
not A’s goal of getting cake. Sen’s position on these issues is summarized below in Table 
Two. 
 
Table Two: Sen’s Realized Agency Success vs. Effective Freedom 
 Realized Agency 
Success 
Effective Freedom 
B gives A cake, 
because A wants it. 
Yes Yes 
A wants cake, and 
B gives A cake, but 
not because A 
wants it. 
Yes No 
A wants cake, but 
doesn’t get it. 
No No 
B works to provide 
cake, because A 
wants it, but B fails. 
No Perhaps, but only to the extent that A’s goal of 
B’s working on A’s behalf is realized 
 
To consider an example in a public policy context, suppose we want peace in Country B but 
are not in a position to choose or do anything to bring an end to the violence there. If our 
representative works to establish peace in Country B, because she believes that it is what we 
want, then our agency freedom is enhanced by her actions and the resulting achievements 
that we value, and have reason to value. This is so even if do not (or cannot) play any role in 
the peace process ourselves. This holds true whether we have acted to inform her of our 
desire for peace directly, or if she anticipates our desire without any direct action from us, 
for example, based on our expressed desire in a similar situation, or from general polls in 
which we did not personally participate. Again, the process is important. If someone works 
for peace, not because we would choose it, but only because she thinks a petroleum company 
in which she has a financial interest will make more money if there is peace, then our 
effective freedom is not enhanced. She is not representing our actual interests or will. 
Table Three offers a summary of Sen’s interrelated empowerment concepts and their 
corresponding attainment using the above peace example. The concepts are ordered as they 
                                                 
5
 See: Sen, 1992. p. 67. n.14. 
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reflect robust empowerment. Control freedom, is the most robust of these concepts, followed 
by IAS, and then achievement realized by effective freedom. At the bottom is Sen’s RAS, 
which Sen describes as a measure of my agency “irrespective of the part I manage to 
personally play in bringing about the achievement” (Sen, 1992. p. 58). I have argued that 
some forms of RAS are too weak to qualify as a type of agency. I believe that Sen should not 
consider an individual’s satisfied objectives an agency achievement when they occur 
irrespective of any role of the individual plays. Such achievements may enhance her well-
being, and may even be considered realizations of her agency objectives, but are not 
exercises of her agency.  
 
Table Three: Sen’s Agency Concepts 
Agency Concept Example 
Control 
Freedom 
I want peace in country A. I personally negotiate a cease-fire and ensure 
that it takes place. 
Instrumental 
Agency Success 
I want peace in country A. I play some role in securing peace. For 
example, I start a campaign for peace, actively lobby politicians to work 
for peace, and so forth. 
Effective 
Freedom 
I want peace in country A and because my representatives are aware that 
(I and others like me) want peace, a peace pact is negotiated and 
implemented. (Note: My will does not have to be the only motivating 
factor for peace, but it must be one of the motivating factors). 
Realized Agency 
Success  
I want peace in country A. Peace takes hold in country A irrespective of 
any role I have in bringing about peace. 
 
Thus far I have focused on agency achievements and agency freedom, choosing and 
achieving one’s objectives. However, Sen is also concerned with limitations and violations 
of agency freedom. For Sen if a person is forced to perform an action that she would have 
performed voluntarily, she might get what she wanted and thereby realize the desired 
functioning, but she is not acting as an agent due to a “violation of the process aspect of [her] 
freedom, since an action is being forced on her (even though it is an action she would have 
chosen freely)” (Sen 2005, p. 153; see also Sen, 2004). Suppose I want Candidate X to win 
and I intend to vote for her. Suppose further that on Election Day I am confronted by armed 
Candidate X enthusiasts who force me to vote for Candidate X. In this case my objective is 
successfully realized (I voted for Candidate X), but my agency is compromised. The 
realization of the agency objective is disqualified as an agency achievement due to violations 
of the process aspect of freedom. 
My well-being may be enhanced despite the violation of my agency, if for example, voting 
for Candidate X really meant a lot to me. But, it is likely that any enhancement of my well-
being will be offset (I am glad I voted for X, but wish it did not happen this way) or entirely 
outweighed (I wanted to vote for X, but not this way), by the violations of my process 
freedom. Violations of process freedom are not simply occasional events (like armed zealots 
on Election Day), but can be products of oppressive social arrangements and part of daily 
life. For example, some women may be not be free to Sen calls on those who design and 
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implement public policies and development projects to work towards promoting, protecting, 
and restoring both agency freedom and well-being freedom:  
Social arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, the market, the legal 
system, political parties, the media, public interest groups, and public discussion 
forums, among others) are investigated in terms of their contribution to enhancing 
and guaranteeing the substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of 
change, rather than passive recipients of dispensed benefits (Sen, 1999. pp. xii – 
xiii). 
Thus, Sen’s view has a robust role for empowerment in the form of agency as it calls for 
individuals to be empowered agents of change throughout the development process. 
1.3. Well-Being Freedom and Achievements 
In addition to promoting empowerment in the form of agency, Sen also advocates that 
institutions and development polices be created and evaluated in relation to human well-
being.  As we have seen, well-being and agency are distinct, but closely related concepts. My 
well-being may be enhanced or diminished as a result of my agency freedom and 
achievements, which can extend beyond my direct control. For Sen a person’s well-being 
may be influenced or affected by other-regarding concerns and by events that she cares about 
even if they do not affect her directly. For example, my well-being may be enhanced by 
learning that a peace agreement has been reached in a distant country even if I have never 
been there and do not know anyone who has. My well-being is enhanced because these 
events contribute to my happiness, even though they do not change my personal 
circumstances or advantage in other ways. 
The concept of “standard of living” is narrower than that of well-being. It relates only to 
aspects of one’s own personal advantage and does not reflect satisfaction caused by the 
success of my other-regarding aims. As David Crocker suggests, the nature and relations of 
Sen’s concepts of agency, well-being, and standard of living can be helpfully represented in 
terms of three concentric circles: 
The largest (agency) circle represents a person’s autonomous choice of action or, 
more generally, of a way of life. Among choices that the person might make are 
those that enhance or diminish his own well-being (as well as those that concern 
others or impersonal causes). Still narrower are those choices that affect one’s 
standard of living—those aspects of his well-being such as nutrition or physical 
health that derive from his own being rather his response to the well or ill-being of 
others (Crocker, 2004). 
Crocker quickly, and correctly, adds that for far too many well-being and living standards 
are not matters of their own control. I add that this is true, not only for the economically or 
socially impoverished, but also for the ill, the grief stricken, the socially oppressed, and 
many (if not all) others to varying extents. Of course, Sen’s focus is those whose lack of 
basic capabilities results in an impoverished well-being or standard of living, not those 
whose ability to own a yacht or win an Olympic medal is beyond their control.  
Thus, Sen’s concept of well-being is related to empowerment in that well-being can be 
limited by the power one has to make choices. For example, choosing to eat enough 
nutritious food to be healthy can have a tremendous effect on one’s standard of living, but 
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not everyone is free (or empowered) to do so. Well-being is also related to empowerment in 
that individuals who are healthy and/or have other personal advantages have a greater power 
to make choices, act, and impact the world.  
Like his concept of agency, Sen’s concept of well-being has an achievement dimension and a 
freedom dimension. A person’s well-being achievement can be understood as a set of 
interrelated beings and doings, or functionings. Sen explains: 
The relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things as being 
adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and 
premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, 
having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on. The claim 
is that functionings are constitutive of a person’s being, and an evaluation of 
wellbeing has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements (Sen 
1992, p. 39). 
A person’s well-being freedom is her capability to achieve various combinations of 
functionings represented in her capability set: the set of “all the alternative combinations of 
functionings a person can choose to have” (Ibid.).  In other words, one’s capability set 
represents the various lifestyles that person is empowered to achieve. Sen recognizes this 
freedom to choose from various options as a very important aspect of well-being.  He writes: 
A properly described social state need not merely be described in terms of who did 
what, but can also be seen as telling us what options each person had. Thus seen, 
the preference or valuation over different social states can include assessment of 
the opportunities enjoyed by different persons…The rejection of alternatives that 
were available but not chosen are a part of ‘what happened’ and thus a part of the 
appropriately described social state (Sen 2002, p. 593). 
Sen makes a comparison between person A, who chooses to fast (over the available option of 
eating), and person B, who has no choice but to starve, effectively conveys the significance 
of capabilities for well-being. Both A and B may have realized the same functioning of 
malnourishment. But A chooses not to eat, even though she has the resources and freedom to 
do so, and for this reason is said to be better off (to have a better standard of living) than B. It 
is in this way that available, but un-chosen alternatives of one’s capability set are an 
important part of “what happened” and of one’s wellness of being. One’s capability set, 
including un-chosen options, reflects an individual’s freedom to engage the world and make 
significant decisions about what she will be and do in her life.  In other words, a person’s 
capability set can reflect the level of empowerment she is experiencing. The more valuable 
capabilities she has, the more empowered she is. Similarly, if a person lacks certain basic 
capabilities she may be poor, oppressed, or disempowered.  
Thus, Sen’s CA offers an understanding of empowerment as the process of expanding an 
individual’s well-being freedom, or set of valuable capabilities. Of course, for reasons 
discussed above, the addition of trivial capabilities will not be empowering. This 
understanding of empowerment is less obvious, than the role of empowerment as agency in 
Sen’s account. Indeed, although many cite the acquisition of individual capabilities (literacy, 
employment, etc.) as empowering, few make explicit that this process of expanding of an 
individual’s set of valuable capabilities is an empowerment process in Sen’s account. 
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Nevertheless, I believe that the understanding of empowerment as capability-set expansion is 
an important feature of Sen’s CA. 
1.4. A Summary of Sen’s Empowerment Concepts 
Sen’s CA offers two valuable and central roles for empowerment: (1) agency, and (2) 
capability-set expansion. Agency empowerment is grounded in Sen’s concept of agency 
freedom, which has both an opportunity aspect: our ability to achieve, and a process aspect: 
the process of that achievement. Other things being equal, the more valuable and valued 
functionings that we are able to achieve, the more empowered we are. However, if we are 
forced to achieve a functioning that we value our process freedom is violated, our agency is 
frustrated, and our achievement is not a reflection of empowerment. 
Our capability sets reflect opportunities we have to achieve valued objectives. Expanding 
capability sets to include more valuable and valued capabilities is an empowerment process. 
Other things being equal, the more valuable capabilities we have, the more power we have to 
decide about and achieve valuable functionings. Both the process and the status of individual 
empowerment can be accounted for within the freedom aspect of both sides of Sen’s 
agency/well-being distinction. 
2. PART TWO: NUSSBAUM’S VERSION OF THE CAPABILITY APPROACH 
2.1. Nussbaum and Sen; Capabilities and Functionings; Agency and Well-Being 
In Part One I discussed how distinctions between agency and well-being and between 
capabilities and functionings give shape to key concepts of Sen’s account. I concluded that 
(1) agency and (2) capability-set expansion can be helpfully understood as the fundamental 
empowerment concepts of Sen’s CA. In this section I argue that like Sen, Nussbaum has a 
strong role for empowerment that can be helpfully represented as both agency and 
capability-set expansion.  
Nussbaum accepts Sen’s distinction between capabilities and functionings but not his 
distinction between agency and well-being. Although she agrees with Sen that “the concepts 
introduced by these distinctions are important” she claims that “all the important distinctions 
can be captured as aspects of the capability/function distinction” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 14). 
Before discussing why Nussbaum rejects Sen’s distinctions, it is important to be clear about 
what Nussbaum is not claiming. 
Nussbaum is not claiming that the empowerment concept Sen calls “agency” is misguided or 
an unimportant part of the CA. Indeed, several of Nussbaum’s central capabilities concern 
one’s ability to reflect on one’s own life and make choices about how to live (Nussbaum, 
2000; 2006; 2011). Moreover, Nussbaum argues that people should be recognized as 
“sources of agency and worthy in their own right, with their own plans to make and their 
own lives to live…deserving of all necessary support for their equal opportunity to be such 
agents” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 58). So, it is not agency per se that Nussbaum is reluctant to 
accept; rather it is Sen’s well-being/agency distinction. 
Nussbaum provides two reasons for avoiding Sen’s distinction: (1) she is “not sure that any 
extra clarity is added by using a well-being/agency distinction” or “that any important 
philosophical distinctions are blurred by sticking to a simpler set of distinctions” and (2) she 
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“fears that the Utilitarian associations of the idea of ‘well-being’ may cause some readers to 
suppose that [Sen] is imagining a way of enjoying well-being that does not involve active 
doing and being” (Ibid. p. 14). I consider (2) first.  
The “Utilitarian associations” that Nussbaum fears refer to development approaches that 
seek to maximize utility and typically rely on subjective reports of individual welfare. On 
such accounts “well-being” is used interchangeably with “welfare” and both terms represent 
a passive state of preference satisfaction. As Nussbaum explains: “[B]y focusing on the state 
of satisfaction, Utilitarianism shows a deficient regard for agency. Contentment is not the 
only thing that matters in a human life, active striving matters too” (Nussbaum 2006, p. 73).  
Nussbaum contends that some familiar with utilitarianism may conflate Sen’s relatively 
objective concept of well-being, which reflects actively being and doing, with the more 
traditional utilitarian concept of “well-being” which is passive, and problematically 
subjective (Nussbaum 2000 pp. 111 - 161; see also Sen 1985 p. 53). She argues that we can 
avoid this confusion by avoiding Sen’s well-being/agency distinction, which may suggest to 
some that all the action is on the agency side of the dichotomy. Thus, Nussbaum’s refuses to 
adopt Sen’s agency/well-being distinction because she values agency and is concerned that 
the distinction may result in confusing the CA with a view that has a deficient regard for 
agency. 
Nussbaum is correct that some familiar with passive utilitarian concepts of welfare and well-
being, might initially find Sen’s use of “well-being” confusing or misleading. However, I 
submit that this initial confusion of some does not require avoiding the well-being/agency 
distinction. Economics and philosophy are loaded with technical jargon. Thus Sen’s “well-
being” is not the only concept that calls for continual attention. (Consider Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia or Mill’s utility.)  It is not obvious that any initial confusion that may result from 
Sen’s use of “well-being” would damage the success of the CA enough to avoid the well-
being/agency distinction, even if using the distinction requires theorists to stress the active 
role of “well-being” within the approach. 
It is possible that the benefits of using Sen’s agency/well-being distinction outweigh the 
costs. But Nussbaum does not recognize any benefits of using Sen’s distinction. She does not 
think any clarity is added by using the distinction or that “any important philosophical 
distinctions are blurred by sticking to a simpler set of distinctions” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 14). 
Nussbaum holds that all the important concepts and distinctions represented in Sen’s CA 
“can be captured as aspects of the capability/function distinction” (Ibid.). 
Nussbaum holds that Sen’s “agency freedom” can be represented entirely within the category 
of capability. If an individual has the capability to do X, i.e., the freedom to choose and 
achieve functioning X – then she is free to act as an agent with regard to X.6  In other words, 
agency is central to the concept of capability. The capability for X represents both one’s 
freedom to choose and to achieve X. Similarly, Sen’s “agency achievements” can be 
accounted for as a subset of functionings: those functionings an individual autonomously 
                                                 
6
 I am here concerned with Nussbaum’s “combined capabilities.” 2000, pp. 84 – 85. 
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chooses and freely achieves.7  In this way, both the freedom and the achievement aspect of 
Sen’s concept of agency can be represented by the capability/functioning distinction. 
Recall that if one has the capability to be well-nourished then she can choose whether or not 
to achieve the functioning being well-nourished. Because she can decide, i.e., act as an agent 
with regard to fasting and eating, the functioning she achieves is what Sen calls an agency 
achievement. The starving person lacks the capability, that is, the ability to choose to be 
well-nourished. (She also lacks the capability to fast.) Because she has no choice but to 
starve, the functioning she achieves – starving – does not reflect her agency, but rather her 
impoverished capability set. If my interpretation is correct, then Nussbaum believes that we 
would do well to replace Table One (above) which represents Sen’s Agency/Well-Being, and 
Freedom/Achievement distinctions with Table Four (below) which represents only the 
distinction between capability and functioning. 
 
Table Four: Nussbaum’s Capability/Functioning Distinction 
Capability Functioning 
Freedom to achieve - opportunities to make 
choices and decisions about and realize 
goals and objectives including, but not 
limited to personal well-being. 
Achievements - realized goals and 
objectives, including, but not limited to 
personal well-being and passive 
achievements (for example, digesting food.) 
  
2.2. The List  
David Crocker proposes an additional reason for Nussbaum’s reluctance to make use of 
Sen’s agency/well-being distinction. He claims that “the very structure of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach require that she reject Sen’s normative duality of agency and well-
being in favor of an integrated and complex norm of human functioning composed of both 
functionings and capabilities” (Crocker 2008 p. 161). Crocker suggests that Nussbaum 
cannot accept Sen’s distinction because of deep structural and normative differences 
between Sen and Nussbaum’s accounts.  
Crocker (correctly) describes Sen as holding that persons as individual and collective agents 
should decide their own actions rather than having them decided by others or by impersonal 
events (Crocker 2008). The emphasis in this position, according to Crocker, is on the contrast 
between a person or group deciding for itself and being the ‘recipient’ of someone else’s 
decision (Ibid.). Sen leaves it to the agents involved in the relevant community to determine 
what capabilities to value, and how to understand and weight them in relation to local beliefs 
and circumstances through a process of democratic deliberation. It is assumed that this 
valuation process in which the details of process and outcome are completely left to the 
relevant community is an empowering exercise of agency.8 Crocker contrasts this account of 
Sen with the following description of Nussbaum’s account: 
                                                 
7
 It may be worth noting that Crocker proposes that agency achievement is distinct from functionings; 
which he claims are all strictly well-being achievements. This is an interesting position, and not one 
shared by Sen.  
8
 For more on this process see Keleher (2008).  
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Nussbaum gives prescriptive priority to a vision of truly human functioning and 
capabilities—of which practical reason is one such. This vision, the result of 
philosophical argument, is to be enshrined in a nation’s constitution and should 
function to protect but also constrain individual and collective exercise of practical 
reason. Nussbaum restricts the scope of practical agency to that of specifying the 
norms the philosopher sets forth and the constitution entrenches…The basic choice 
that Nussbaum leaves to individuals and communities is how to specify and 
implement the ideal of human flourishing that she – the philosopher – offers as the 
moral basis for constitutional principles (Crocker 2008. p. 161 – 62). 
Thus, Crocker suggests that Nussbaum’s CA has an impoverished role of agency and 
empowerment relative to Sen’s account.9 Crocker is correct that Nussbaum proposes a list of 
central capabilities that reflect a philosophical account of what is universally human, and that 
she argues that the basic political principles underpinning these capabilities should be 
guaranteed by constitutions. However, the scope of agency in Nussbaum’s CA is more 
robust than Crocker recognizes. I argue that within Nussbaum’s CA, agency extends beyond 
“specifying the norms the philosopher sets forth and the constitution entrenches” and offers 
individuals much more than the basic choice of “how to specify and implement the ideal of 
human flourishing that she offers.”  
Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities is “open-ended and humble,” it “can always be 
contested and remade” (Nussbaum 2000 p. 77). It is not a “fixed forever” list. Indeed, 
Nussbuam’s current list is a product of revision. Nussbaum says her current list “represents 
the results of years of cross-cultural discussion, and comparisons between earlier and later 
versions will show that the input of other voices has shaped its content in many ways” (Ibid. 
p. 76).  Moreover, Nussbaum counts variations of the list reflected in constitutions as a 
success for her overall view: “Indeed it is by design that the capabilities list starts from an 
intuitive idea, that of human dignity, that is already basic to the constitutional framing in 
many of the nations of the world (prominently including India, Germany, and South Africa)” 
(Nussbuam 2006, p. 155).  
Nussbaum tells us that “we should view any given version of the list as a proposal put 
forward in a Socratic fashion, to be tested against the most secure of our intuitions as we 
attempt to arrive at a type of reflective equilibrium for political purposes” (Nussbaum 2000 
p. 77). Moreover, Nussbaum believes the list can and should reflect “a wide range of 
religious and other views about human life” (Nussbaum 2006 p. 296). She explains that: “a 
concern for cultural variety (both within a nation and across nations) has been a prominent 
part of [this] version of the approach. This concern is internal to the capabilities list itself” 
(Ibid.).  
It is with this concern in mind that Nussbaum explains her consideration of “the list as open-
ended and subject to ongoing revision and rethinking, in the way that any society’s account 
                                                 
9
 Crocker asserts that “Nussbaum’s concepts of practical reason and control are less robust and less 
defensible than Sen’s ideal of agency.” Although, I do not pursue the issue here, I believe that in 
limiting his comparison with Sen’s ideal of agency to only two of Nussbaum’s listed capabilities, as 
opposed to considering her account as a whole, including her use of the concept capability, Crocker 
has fails to fully appreciate the role of empowerment as agency on Nussbaum’s account, and 
consequently mis-framed the debate. For more see Keleher (2007).  
Agency and capability expansion  
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 11 (2), 2014   
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
 
67 
of its most fundamental entitlements is always subject to supplementation (or deletion)” 
(Ibid. p. 78). Thus, Nussbaum clearly holds that it is always possible for items to be both 
added to and taken away from her version of the list. These passages show that Nussbaum 
ideal list is not merely a product of her philosophical reflections, but a consensus that 
emerges from a global exchange of ideas in an on-going debate about what is required for 
life with dignity. Thus, any version of the list is more like a snapshot of an ongoing process 
that can be used as a starting point for further debate by national and global political 
communities as constitutions are written and amended, than a fixed forever list carved in 
stone to be handed down from the philosopher on high.  
Moreover, use of Nussbaum’s list does not force individuals or groups to achieve every 
functioning on the list. In contrast, it asserts that citizens should have the capability, that is, 
the freedom to choose as autonomous agents which functionings to achieve, and which to 
pass up, as they live in accordance with their own conception of the good (without harming 
others). In this way, Nussbaum, like Sen, believes that the capabilities an individual chooses 
not to realize, the un-choosen capabilities in one’s capability set, are an important reflection 
of the freedom an individual enjoys. The options a person has but chooses not to pursue 
reflect her empowerment, and in this way are an important part of well-being. 
Moreover, Nussbaum’s CA can be understood as seeking to empower individuals by 
ensuring that their capability sets include certain valuable capabilities that are central to 
human dignity.  To be empowered in this way is to be empowered to expand one’s own 
capability set to include capabilities not specified by the list, but determined to be valuable 
by the individual (or community). Thus, the important understanding of empowerment as 
capability-set expansion found in Sen’s version of the CA also plays a robust role on 
Nussbaum’s version. 
Nussbaum’s choice not to use Sen’s well-being/agency distinction results in more emphasis 
on capability-set expansion than on Sen’s account. This is because expansions of both 
agency freedom and well-being freedom on Sen’s account, are simply considered capability 
set expansions on Nussbaum’s account. Thus Sen and Nussbaum’s versions of the CA both 
accommodate the same sort of empowerment of individuals (and groups) but represent it 
differently. 
Although the role agency plays as a necessary part of capability is relatively implicit; 
Nussbaum’s list makes the importance agency explicit. Nussbaum’s inclusion of “affiliation” 
in her list makes clear that her use of the concepts “capabilities” and “functionings,” like 
Sen’s use of “well-being,” “agency,” “freedom,” and “achievement,” extends beyond the 
individual agent. Nussbaum adds that “Protecting this capability means protecting 
institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the 
freedom of assembly and political speech” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 79). On Nussbaum’s 
account, an individual who is capable of affiliation is capable of (1) having (what Sen calls) 
agency objectives that extend beyond one’s own personal advantage, for example, wanting 
the lives of her children to go well, and (2) working with others towards the achievement of 
shared (yet autonomously chosen) goals. 
Several other capabilities on Nussbaum’s list also stand out as empowerment concepts for 
individuals and groups. Perhaps most significantly, practical reason: “the ability to form a 
conception of the good life and to engage in critic
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life” (Ibid.). Practical reason, together with affiliation, has a “special importance” for 
“characteristically human thought and planning about one’s own life… [through] complex 
forms of discourse, concern, and reciprocity with other human beings” (Ibid. p. 82). Several 
of the other capabilities on Nussbaum’s list explicitly address empowerment concepts that 
Sen would call agency (see: Keleher 2007 ch. 5).  
Thus, when one understands Nussbaum’s list as open-ended, revisable, multi-realizable, and 
focused on individual capabilities (or freedoms), it is clear that her account of practical 
agency extends well beyond “specifying the norms the philosopher sets forth and the 
constitution entrenches” and offers individuals and communities much more than the basic 
choice of “how to specify and implement the ideal of human flourishing that she offers.” 
Thus, the differences between Sen and Nussbaum with regard to agency are not as 
significant as Crocker suggests. 
Nussbaum accounts not only for agency, as an essential aspect of capability, but also for 
many of Sen’s other key concepts, including: agency freedom, as an aspect of capability; 
agency achievement, as a subset of functionings; well-being freedom, as capability; and 
well-being achievement, as functionings. For his part, Sen has made clear that he “has 
nothing against the listing of capabilities” as long as they are not “fixed forever lists” and 
that he sees “Nussbaum’s powerful use of a given list of capabilities for some minimal rights 
against deprivation as being extremely useful” (Sen 2005 pp. 159 -160). Thus, there is a 
great deal of common ground between Sen and Nussbaum on the role of empowerment 
within the CA.  
As discussed above, Nussbaum believes that the important concepts of Sen’s account are 
adequately represented in her version of the CA, but with a simpler set of distinctions: 
namely the distinction between capabilities and functionings. Sen agrees that both well-being 
freedom and agency freedom can be represented as capabilities. But holds that it is important 
to recognize both types of capabilities because the former may be of “more general interest 
to pubic policy” while the later is of “primary interest to the person’s own sense of values” 
(Sen, 2008 p. 289). It seems that just as those who choose to use Sen’s distinction may need 
to make clear that well-being is not a passive utilitarian concept, those who elect to follow 
Nussbaum in choosing not to use the distinction may have to emphasize that agency and 
autonomous choice are part and parcel of capabilities and that some, but not all capabilities 
(i.e., other regarding capabilities) enhance an individual’s own well-being.  
I do not advocate either using or avoiding Sen’s agency/wellbeing distinction here. Instead, I 
wish to underscore the fact that despite emphasizing different language of empowerment, 
both Nussbaum’s and Sen’s versions of the CA make sense of empowerment, not only as 
agency, but also as capability-set expansion. I submit that many of the often-cited differences 
in the interpretation and role of empowerment of the two versions are a matter of style and 
emphasis not a matter of disagreement on fundamental conceptions of empowerment within 
the Capability Approach. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay considers empowerment within Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s 
respective versions of the CA. Neither Sen nor Nussbaum explicitly use the language of 
empowerment. However, empowerment plays a robust role on both versions of the CA.  Two 
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of the most important forms of empowerment found within the CA are (1) agency, and (2) 
capability-set expansion. Agency, or the ability to decide for oneself and act autonomously 
to bring about change in the world, is heavily emphasized on Sen’s account as a critical 
dimension of his agency/well-being distinction. Nussbaum rejects Sen’s distinction, but 
often uses the language of agency and freedom as she explains her approach. Moreover, she 
systematically accounts for agency as part of the capability/functioning distinction. For 
Nussbaum, agency is already represented within the concept of capabilities. If an individual 
has the capability to achieve functioning X, then the have the ability to decide for oneself 
and to act autonomously to achieve X where the achievement of X is a change in the world. 
In focusing on the capability/functioning distinction, Nussbaum places great emphasis on 
empowerment as capability-set expansion. Of course, given Nussbaum’s use of agency and 
capability, capability-set expansion is a promotion of agency. For Nussbaum, this sort of 
empowerment involves ensuring that individuals have certain valuable capabilities so that 
they can freely choose for themselves what to do and be. Sen’s account can also be read as 
advocating empowerment as capability-set expansion and he acknowledges that well-being 
freedom and agency freedom are both types of capabilities. Thus, it seems that although they 
use different language and at times emphasize different aspects of empowerment, Sen and 
Nussbaum are both promoting the same robust role of empowerment in human development: 
enhancing the substantive freedom of individuals to achieve a lifestyle they value. 
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